Line Drawing, Code Switching, and Spanish as Second-Hand Smoke: English-Only Workplace Rules and Bilingual Employees by Colon, Mark
Line Drawing, Code Switching, and Spanish as
Second-Hand Smoke: English-Only Workplace
Rules and Bilingual Employees
Mark Col6nt
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, the language an employee may speak is a source of conflict in
America's workplaces. In the past four years, the number of complaints filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against com-
panies implementing English-only policies has risen exponentially.'
This trend is expected to continue for a number of reasons. First, civil rights
groups report an increase in complaints following state and municipal voter
initiatives that declare English as the official language in a jurisdiction ("Offi-
cial English" laws).2 Additionally, the EEOC has indicated that "claims
of... discrimination involving language issues" are an "enforcement priority"
for the agency, 3 and consequently, it has instituted an agency-wide initiative
that recognizes certain language-minority groups as needing more of their at-
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1. The EEOC reports a 500% increase in the four years since they began to keep track of such
complaints. The EEOC is the Federal Agency charged with investigating employment discrimination
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Maria Shim, English-Only Cases Multiply,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23, 2000, at B 1.
2. See Steven W. Bender, Direct Democracy and Distrust: The Relationship Between Language,
Law, Rhetoric and the Language Vigilantism Experience, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REv. 145, 153 (1997).
There is some evidence that this increase in the number of complaints may be driven by employers'
increased willingness to implement English-only workplace rules following or even prior to highly-
publicized "Official English" voter initiative campaigns. See, e.g., id., (discussing employer practices in
California in the aftermath of California's English language initiative, Proposition 63); BILL PIATT,
,ONLY ENGLISH? 168 (1990); RAYMOND TATALOVICH, NATIVISM REBORN? 140 (1995) (discussing
employer practices in Arizona prior to adoption of its English-only ballot initiative, Proposition 106).
Alternatively, following any high-profile English-only campaign, workers may also be more sensitive to
such rules and more knowledgeable of their rights. Twenty-two states have made English their official
language, most since the English-only movement gained force in the mid-1980's. See Linda Green-
house, Supreme Court Roundup: Appeal to Save English-Only Law Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1999,
at A16.
3. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 209 at N:3061 (laying out the 1996 EEOC National En-
forcement Plan for the administrative enforcement and litigation of the laws within the EEOC's juris-
diction).
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tention.4
Undoubtedly, though, the most significant source of increased language
conflict in the workplace is the substantial growth in the national labor force of
ethnic groups whose "primary language" is not English.5 For instance, the 1990
Census revealed that the largest ethnic language-minority groups in the United
States had grown substantially over the previous decade.6 That trend is con-
tinuing, as preliminary data from the millennial Census indicates that the ratio
of Americans whose primary language is not English increased from one in
seven in 1990 to nearly one in five in 2000. 7 In California, forty percent of
families use a foreign language as their primary mode of communication in
their homes. Moreover, this trend is not expected to reverse itself in the near
future. 9 Consequently, Americans can expect continued tension over restric-
tions on language use in the workplace as the country becomes increasingly
ethnically and linguistically diverse.' 0
The uncertain state of the law concerning English-only workplace rules is
further exacerbating the situation. Because neither the Supreme Court nor Con-
gress has addressed the legality of English-only workplace rules,1 the lower
4. See Shim, supra note 1, at BI (describing the EEOC's outreach efforts to Asian and Latino
groups, in complying with the directives of its National Enforcement Plan).
5. See S. Craig Moore, English-Only Rules in the Workplace, 15 LAB. LAw. 295, 295 (1999). Ac-
cording to the Federal Government, "[p]ersons whose mother tongue [primary language] is not English"
refers to persons "[w]ho normally use languages other than English, or who live in households where
languages other than English are spoken." Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin;
Proposed Revision, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,728, 62,728 (Sept. 19, 1980).
6. See Edward M. Chen, Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.: Speak-English-Only Rules and the Demise of
Workplace Pluralism, I ASIAN L.J. 155, 157 (1994) (reporting that the growth included 17,340,000
Spanish speakers (56.0% increase), 1,319,000 speakers of Chinese languages (109.2% increase),
899,000 speakers of Filipino languages (89.5% increase), 644,000 speakers of Asian Indian languages
(164.8% increase), 626,000 Korean speakers (135.3% increase), and 713,000 speakers of Vietnamese,
Thai, and Laotian languages (154.6% increase)).
7. Compare Eric Schmitt, Census Data Show a Sharp Increase in Living Standard, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2001, at Al (reporting that approximately 18% of all residents who are at least five years old, or
45 million Americans, do not speak English in the home), with Chen, supra note 6, at 157 (reporting
that approximately 14% of Americans, or 39 million people, indicated that they use a language other
than English in the home on the 1990 Census). See generally U.S. Department of Commerce, American
Community Survey, at http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/databank.html.
8. See Schmitt, supra note 7, at Al.
9. See Moore, supra note 5, at 295 n.3 (reporting that the number of Hispanics in the labor force is
projected to grow by more than 4.6 million by the year 2006, and that the Asian and Pacific Islander
labor force participation rate will increase by 41% by 2006).
10. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 296 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[t]he growth of the immigrant population and the present mood of anti-immigrant back-
lash mean that English-only rules are likely to become more prevalent"). Within the past eighteen
months, the EEOC has reported both the largest judgment for monetary damages ($192,000) ever ren-
dered against an employer for an English-only rule, Employer's English-Only Policy Brings a Settle-
ment of$192,000, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2000, at A12, as well as the largest cash settlement ($2.44 mil-
lion) ever secured from an employer for an English-only rule, see Associated Press, Housekeepers Told
to Speak Only English Get Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2001 at A24.
11. But see infra notes 244-245 and accompanying text (explaining how Congress briefly dis-
cussed the EEOC's Guidelines for English-only Workplace Rules while amending Title VI of the 1991
Civil Rights Act).
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courts and the EEOC have exercised broad discretion in deciding this issue.' 2
In 1980, the EEOC amended its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Na-
tional Origin (the "Guidelines") 3 to identify English-only workplace rules as a
form of national origin discrimination and to include a presumption that such
rules have a discriminatory impact on national origin groups.14 Since then, the
Ninth Circuit has been the only federal appellate court to directly address the
issue of an employer's English-only workplace rule,1 5 and it has issued opin-
ions both specifically supporting and specifically rejecting the EEOC's Guide-
lines.' 6
This Note will demonstrate how the analysis in the leading cases misinter-
prets or ignores important nuances within the bilingual population. The leading
federal appellate court decisions on English-only workplace rules have set up a
false dichotomy by distinguishing "fully" bilingual from monolingual national
origin minorities, including in the latter group those plaintiffs with limited
English-language proficiency.' 7 I will explain how these cases have understated
the discriminatory impact of English-only workplace rules on all national origin
language minorities, particularly those that the leading cases describe as fully
bilingual. I will also show how the EEOC's Guidelines on National Origin Dis-
crimination-demonstrating a truer understanding of language practices among
bilingual national origin minorities-more accurately fulfill Congress' objec-
tive to eliminate discriminatory workplace practices than does the analysis of
the leading cases. The Note concludes by suggesting some benefits that would
12. See Lisa L. Behm, Comment, Protecting Linguistic Minorities Under Title VII The Need for
Judicial Deference to the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 81 MARQ.
L. REv. 569, 580 (1998).
13. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (2001). The Guidelines include discrimination based on "linguistic char-
acteristics" as a subset of national origin discrimination.
14. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2001). The EEOC's action was most likely in response to the first fed-
eral appellate court ruling, issued earlier that same year, upholding an employer's English-only work-
place restriction. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
The Gloor court made specific mention that it was ruling in the absence of any guidance from the
EEOC. Id. at 269.
15. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have issued unpublished opinions affirming decisions of
their own District Courts. See Long v. First Union Corp., 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996), aff'g 894 F.
Supp. 933 (E.D. Va. 1995); Gonzalez v. Salvation Army, 985 F.2d 578 (11 th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
508 U.S. 910 (1993).
16. Compare Gutierrez v. Mun. Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1039 n.7 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot,
490 U.S. 1016 (1989) (citing the EEOC Guidelines approvingly and noting that "[the] guidelines are
generally entitled to considerable deference so long as they are not inconsistent with Congressional in-
tent"), with Spun Steak v. Garcia, 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993), reh 'g denied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1228 (1994) (noting that "[n]othing in the plain language of [Title
VII's proscription of discriminatory practices in the workplace] supports EEOC's English-only rule"
and "[w]e will not defer to an administrative construction of a statute where there are 'compelling indi-
cations that it is wrong"'). Furthermore, since Spun Steak runs contrary to stated EEOC policy and is
now the leading case in the Ninth Circuit, the EEOC is faced with the conundrum of providing different
levels of protection to employees in different regions of the country. This discrepancy has widespread
implications since the Ninth Circuit has the largest number of residents with non-English language
backgrounds. See Chen, supra note 6, at 159.
17. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487; Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270.
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follow from the adoption of the Guidelines by the federal circuits.
In my analysis, I focus at certain times on Spanish-speaking language mi-
norities. This is for a number of reasons: Spanish-speaking minorities are by far
the largest language minority group in the United States;' 8 many Spanish-
language minority groups have experienced a history of discrimination, at least
in part because of their language;' 9 and Spanish-language plaintiffs make up
the large majority of the case law concerning bilingual employees and English-
only Workplace Rules. However, most, if not all, of the analysis applies to
other bilingual language minorities.
21
II. THE ISSUES
A. Defining National Origin Discrimination Under Title VII." Vague
(Congressional) Intent, Minimal (Judicial) Guidance
Currently, no federal statute specifically prohibits employers from adopting
22English-only workplace rules. The EEOC and individual plaintiffs have sued
employers under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 23 which forbids pri-
vate employers from discriminating on the basis of national origin, among other
characteristics. 24 The Supreme Court has found that the purpose of the Act was
to "assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those dis-
18. Chen, supra note 6, and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (finding that Mexican-Americans in Texas
constituted a protected class with the characteristics of a discrete and insular minority, for purposes of
Equal Protection analysis); Alfredo Mirand6, "En la Tierra del Ciego, El Tuerto es Rey" ("In the Land
of the Blind, the One Eyed Person is King"): Bilingualism as a Disability, 26 N.M. L. REv. 75 (1996)
(noting that Spanish-speaking ability has been historically devalued in the United States, e.g., "No
Spanish" rules were the norm in schools throughout the Southwest until the 1960's and "Spanish deten-
tion" was a widely used punishment in the schools).
20. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary Language
in the Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 265, 266 n.8 (1990) (finding that, at that time,
"[a]pparently all of the [English-only in the workplace] cases.., decided by the courts and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission [had] involved Spanish-speaking employees").
21. See generally Chen, supra note 6, at 159 (noting that a number of recent cases have been
brought by Asian and Pacific Islander employees).
22. Employer's English-Only Policy Brings a Settlement of $192,500, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2000,
at A12.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
24. The EEOC is charged with the administration, interpretation, and enforcement of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and is expressly authorized to bring suit under § 706(a) of Title VII. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a). Title VII states, in pertinent part, that
[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his ... terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual employee of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. at § 2000e-2.
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criminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job
environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens., 25 Furthermore, the
Court has instructed that the language of Title VII should be interpreted
broadly, "to strike at the entire spectrum of discriminatory treatment."
26
However, Title VII does not expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis
of language, and disagreements about the connection between language and
national origin have hobbled plaintiffs challenging English-only rules. 27 Un-
fortunately, there is very little legislative history regarding Congress' intent in
including national origin in Title VII as a proscribed category.28 Two members
of Congress did attempt, in rather conclusory fashion, to explain what Congress
meant by including national origin in the Act. Congressman Roosevelt, one of
the bill's sponsors, offered that "[national origin] means national. It means the
country from which you or your forbears came from (sic).' 29 Congressman
Dent offered what national origin is not: "National origin, of course, has noth-
ing to do with color, religion, or the race of an individual. A man may have mi-
grated here from Great Britain and still be a colored person., 30 However, Title
VII's legislative history offers no guidance regarding employment practices
aimed at underlying personal characteristics, including language, that are often
closely associated with national origin.
31
The Supreme Court has never discussed employment discrimination based
25. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977) (quoting McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
26. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
27. See, e.g., Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268 (determining that "[n]either [Title VII] nor common under-
standing equates national origin with the language that one chooses to speak" and denying plaintiff's
claim for relief); Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488 (finding that "Title VII is not meant to protect against
rules that merely inconvenience some employees [by prohibiting them from using the language with
which they are most comfortable] even if the inconvenience falls regularly on a protected class").
28. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973) (considering the comments
about national origin discrimination made during the House debate and characterizing the legislative
history as "quite meager"); see also Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National
Origin " Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805 (1994). Professor Perea offers
substantial evidence that the paucity of discussion of the other proscribed categories is because "Con-
gress' principal purpose in enacting Title VII... was to prohibit employment discrimination because of
race or color." Id. at 806; see also id. at 806 n.6 (quoting Congressman Celler, one of the bill's chief
sponsors, stating that "you must remember that the basic purpose of Title VII is to prohibit discrimina-
tion ... on the basis of race or color."), citing 110 CONG. REC. 2556 (1964). Professor Perea's analysis
of Title Vl's legislative history yields the conclusion that "at the time, Congress gave no serious con-
sideration to the content of the national origin term nor to its proper scope."
29. 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964) (statement of Rep. Roosevelt).
30. Id. at 2561 (statement of Rep. Dent).
3 1. A number of commentators have pointed out that ethnic traits and personal characteristics are
often more accurate predictors of prejudicial behavior than a person's national origin. See, e.g., Stephen
M. Cutler, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE L.J. 1164,
1165 (1985) ("Differences in dress, language, accent, and custom associated with a non-American ori-
gin are more likely to elicit prejudicial attitudes than the fact of the [national] origin itself."); Perea,
supra note 28, at 833-34 (explaining that "[ethnic] traits... engender a perception of group distinctive-
ness in persons who are not members of that group. It is the perception of difference, often based on
ethnic traits, that results in discrimination"). See also notes 166-67 and accompanying text for further
discussion.
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upon language.3 2 Furthermore, in its only ruling defining national origin under
Title VII, the Court simply adopted Congressman Roosevelt's vague definition,
without elaborating on the composition of national origin discrimination. 33 In
that decision, the Court held that an employer's citizenship requirement was not
discrimination based upon national origin, as Congress intended to use the
term, and therefore not protected under Title VII.
34
However, lower federal courts have construed "national origin" broadly, to
include at least some underlying personal characteristics, such as accent and
height, that are often highly correlated with national origin.35 The lower courts
have also extended Congressman Roosevelt's basic description of national ori-
gin to find that Congress intended to include persons without any specific na-
36tional affiliation, but sharing a common ancestry, heritage, or background.
For our purposes, it is important to note that, while the legislative history is
meager, Congressman Roosevelt's accepted definition of "national origin" ac-
tually extends the term beyond its normal meaning. Although one's own na-
tional origin, in a strict sense, means the country that you came from, Con-
gressman Roosevelt conflated the term with ancestry when he included
discrimination based upon the national origin of one's ancestors.
37
B. Proof of Workplace Discrimination Based on National Origin
The Supreme Court recognizes two distinct theories of liability under which
32. See Perea, supra note 28, at 820.
33. Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88 (concluding that "[tihe term 'national origin' on its face refers to the
country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came").
34. Id. at 94. The Espinoza court was strongly influenced by the fact that the federal government
had imposed a citizenship requirement in its own hiring practices. Therefore, Justice Marshall reasoned,
it would have been contradictory for Congress to have intended to prohibit private employers from dis-
criminating on the basis of citizenship while allowing the Federal government to do so. The ruling is
somewhat restricted in this sense.
35. See Fragante v. Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 599 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied., 494 U.S. 1081
(1990) (holding, in an employment discrimination case based on national origin, that an employer may
lawfully base an employment decision upon an individual's accent, but only when it interferes materi-
ally with job performance); Carino v. Univ. of Oklahoma Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir.
1984) (finding evidence that an employee in a university dental laboratory was demoted on the basis of
his accent sufficient to establish discriminatory intent based on national origin); Berke v. Ohio Dep't. of
Pub. Welfare, 628 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (affirming district court finding of national
origin discrimination where the plaintiff was denied two positions in State Department of Welfare be-
cause of her accent). See also Davis v. Los Angeles County, 566 F.2d 1334, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding minimum height requirement for firemen had a disparate impact on Mexican-Americans and
was not proven to be job related); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 395 F. Supp. 378, 380-81
(N.D. Cal. 1975) (holding minimum height restriction for police officers had a disparate impact on His-
panics, Asians, and women).
36. BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 356 (3d ed.
1996) (citing cases of Acadians, Gypsies, Ukrainians and Serbians who were all extended "national
origin" status).
37. Ancestry is defined as "family descent or lineage," characteristics which may be independent
of national origin. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 50 (2d coll.
ed. 1982). Therefore, one could have ancestors from two or more different countries. However, one's
own national origin can only be, in the strict sense, the single nation from which one originated.
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a plaintiff may show employment discrimination on the basis of national origin
under Title VII---disparate treatment and disparate impact. 38 Both theories in-
volve an evidentiary burden-shifting framework between the parties.39 Under
either theory, the initial burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination.4 °
1. Disparate Treatment Theory
Disparate treatment was "undoubtedly the most obvious evil Congress had
in mind when it enacted Title VII."'4 1 Under a claim alleging disparate treatment
in the workplace, the "central question is always whether the defendant's ac-
tions were motivated by discriminatory intent.",42 A plaintiff may make out a
prima facie case of an employer's intentional discrimination by presenting ei-
ther direct or circumstantial evidence.43 Circumstantial evidence allows a
plaintiff to satisfy her initial burden of proving intentional discrimination sim-
ply by offering sufficient evidence to give rise to an inference of discriminatory
animus.4 The burden then shifts to the employer to prove that it had a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.45 Finally, the plaintiff may re-
spond with proof that the employer's articulated reason was a pretext to mask
46
unlawful discrimination.
Many commentators have pointed out that challenges to English-only rules
using a disparate treatment theory are rare, largely because the theory's intent
requirement is negated by the fact that English-only rules appear facially neu-
tral; they require that all employees speak English.47 However, two recent dis-
trict court cases used disparate treatment analysis to find an employer liable for
intentionally discriminating against its employees, where an English-only rule
48was imposed at all times while the employees were on the work premises.
38. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988)
39. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 36, at 3-4.
40. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
41. Int. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977).
42. LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 36, at 10-11.
43. ld. at 11.
44. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (finding that "the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
disparate treatment is not onerous").
45. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
46. Id. at 804.
47. See, e.g., Rachel L. Adams, English-Only in the Workplace: A New Judicial Lens Will Provide
More Comprehensive Title VII Protection, 47 CATH. U, L. REv. 1327, 1339-40 (1998) (explaining that
Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Co., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987), is the only circuit court decision to analyze
a Title VII challenge to an English-only workplace rule under disparate treatment theory).
48. EEOC v. Premier Operator Services, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (N.D. Tex. 2000); EEOC v. Syn-
chro-Start-Products, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Il. 1999). See Subsection H1.D.3 infra for a discus-
sion of these cases.
Yale Law & Policy Review
2. Disparate Impact Theory
Most claims against an employer's English-only workplace rule are brought
under a disparate impact theory.49 Illicit motive or intent is irrelevant because
"impact analysis is designed to implement Congressional concern with 'the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation."'' 0 Tradi-
tional disparate impact analysis in Title VII cases was originally established in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,51 where the Supreme Court found that Title VII
proscribed "not only overt discrimination, but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation."5 2 The Court further refined its disparate
impact analysis in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.53 Under a Griggs-Albemarle
analysis, a plaintiff meets her initial evidentiary burden by making out a prima
facie case of discriminatory impact.54 This requires the plaintiffs first prove that
an employer's policy that is neutral on its face nevertheless has a dispropor-
tionate impact on members of protected minority groups.55 In addition, the
plaintiff must show that the practice in question caused the disparity, and that
the disparate impact was both significant and adverse.
5 6
It is important for our purposes to note that the prima facie showing re-
quired of the plaintiff in a disparate impact case is a higher standard than is re-
quired in a disparate treatment case. In a disparate treatment context, the plain-
tiff makes out a prima facie case merely by presenting evidence sufficient to
give rise to an inference of discrimination.5 7 Under a disparate impact standard,
however, the plaintiff must actually prove the discriminatory impact at issue.58
If the plaintiff makes out her prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the
employer to prove that the employment practice in question is "job-related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity. '59 Even if the
employer is able to establish a legitimate business necessity for his or her rule,
the plaintiff may still prevail by demonstrating that a less discriminatory alter-
native employment practice would equally serve the employer's business ne-
cessity. As we shall see, with regard to bilingual employees, the initial step of
49. David T. Wiley, Whose Proof?: Deference to EEOC Guidelines on Disparate Impact Dis-
crimination Analysis of "English-Only" Rules, 29 GA. L. REv. 539, 549 (1995).
50. Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
51. 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
52. Id. at 431.
53. 422 U.S. 405 (1975)
54. Id. at 425.
55. Id.
56. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
57. LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 36, at 11.
58. Id. at 10.
59. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425. Unlike proof of discriminatory intent, both the burden of proof
and the burden of persuasion are shifted to the employer in the second instance.
60. Id.
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proving a significant disparate impact as a result of an English-only rule is of-
ten fatal to any Title VII claim, and effectively moots the second and third step
of the analysis.
61
The Supreme Court subsequently applied a more stringent test for estab-
lishing adverse impact by relaxing the employer's required business necessity
showing. 62 However, Congress overturned that decision in the 1991 Civil
Rights Act that amended Title VII, and the Griggs-Albemarle standard remains
63largely intact today.
C. The EEOC's National Origin Discrimination Guidelines and English-Only
Rules
Acting under its authority to establish procedural guidelines necessary to
carry out the provisions of Title VII, 64 the EEOC published the first Guidelines
on Discrimination Because of National Origin in 1970.65 The Guidelines define
national origin broadly, as "including, but not limited to, the denial of equal
employment opportunity because of an individual's, or his or her ancestor's,
place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic
characteristics of a national origin group."66 In 1980, most likely in response
to the first federal appellate court ruling on the subject,67 the EEOC added a
section specifically addressing English-only rules in the workplace as a form of
national origin discrimination. 68 The newly amended section distinguishes be-
tween employer's "absolute" (applied at all times) and "limited" (applied only
at certain times) English-only workplace rules and reads as follows:
§ 1606.7 Speak-English-only rules.
(a) When applied at all times. A rule requiring employees to speak only English at
all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition of employment. The
primary language of an individual is often an essential national origin characteristic.
61. See infra Subsection H.D.1.
62. See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
63. LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 36, at 37.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a). Congress created the EEOC specifically to administer Title VII. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4. It is important to note that Congress specifically did not grant the EEOC the
authority to promulgate regulations with the force of law. The EEOC was only given authority to issue
"suitable procedural regulations." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1994).
65. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 35 Fed. Reg. 421 (1970) (codified at
29 C.F.R. § 1606). This original version of the Guidelines made only passing reference to employment
discrimination practices based upon language characteristics. See 35 Fed. Reg. 421 (1970) (codified at
29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (b)) (stating that "[the] Commission will examine with particular concern cases ...
grounded in national origin discrimination (such as) the use of tests in the English language where the
individual tested came from circumstances where English ... is not a requirement of the work to be
performed").
66. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2001) (emphasis added).
67. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981) (finding
that an employer's English-only rule did not deny a bilingual employee an equal condition of employ-
ment). See infra Subsection lI.D. I for a detailed discussion of the Gloor ruling.
68. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7.
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Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace, from speaking their primary
language or the language they speak most comfortably, disadvantages an individ-
ual's employment opportunities on the basis of national origin. It may also create an
atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on national origin which
could result in a discriminatory working environment. Therefore, the Commission
will presume that such a rule violates title VII and will closely scrutinize it.
(b) When applied only at certain times. An employer may have a rule requiring that
employees speak only in English at certain times where the employer can show that
the rule is justified by business necessity.69
The amendment further includes a notice requirement that observes that "it
is common for individuals whose primary language is not English to inadver-
tently change from speaking English to speaking their primary language.
Therefore... the employer should inform its employees of the general circum-
stances when speaking only in English is required and of the consequences of
violating the rule."70
D. Bilingual Employees and Burden Shifting.: The Case Law on English-Only
Workplace Rules
1. English-Only Jurisprudence Prior to the EEOC Guidelines: The Fifth
Circuit's Disparate Analysis
a. Saucedo v. Brothers' Well Service: "We don't tolerate no 'Mesican' talk"
Before 1980, only one federal court had addressed the issue of an English-
71 72
only workplace rule. In Saucedo v. Brothers Well Service,, Inc., the district
court for the Southern District of Texas held that an employer engaged in un-
lawful employment discrimination by discharging a Mexican-American em-
ployee for speaking two words of Spanish on the job while retaining another
(Anglo) employee, even though he was guilty of the more serious misdeed of
assaulting another employee during the same incident.73 The facts of the case
are as follows.
Brothers Well Service had hired John Saucedo as a "floor man" on a
"workover rig" (a special rig placed over a normal oil rig to increase declining
production). John Erdelt, Saucedo's immediate supervisor, had warned him on
his first day on the job that the crew supervisor (or "tool pusher" in the parlance
of the oil drilling business), Cleighton E. "Doc" Holliday, "didn't allow any
69. Id.
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c) (2000).
71. Wiley, supra note 49, at 555. The EEOC had applied the Title VII disparate impact analysis to
English-only cases in its own administrative hearings as early as 1970, ten years prior to the introduc-
tion of its Guidelines on English-only Rules. Id. at 554.
72. 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
73. Id. at 922.
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'Mesican' talk.",74 Erdelt told Saucedo that, as far as he was concerned, anyone
could speak any language that he wanted on the job; however, Holliday "sim-
ply did not tolerate any 'Mesican' talk. 75 At the time of his discharge, Holliday
overheard Saucedo speak two words of Spanish to Steve Perez, another bilin-
gual Mexican-American employee, and fired him immediately. 76 When Perez
sought to intervene by protesting the rule and its enforcement, Holliday beat
him.
77
The Saucedo court emphasized three issues in reaching its conclusion that
the company's actions were "clearly a breach of Brothers' (Title VII) obligation
to avoid treating its employees discriminatorily." 78 First, the court noted that
Brothers never gave Saucedo clear notice of the severe consequences of
speaking Spanish on the job.7 9 Next, the court reasoned that there might be cir-
cumstances where a rule absolutely prohibiting speaking a foreign language on
the job, if properly noticed, would be justified. However, those circumstances
are most likely to be dangerous work situations where "any failure of commu-
nication could lead to disastrous results." 80 The Saucedo court therefore deter-
mined that the crux of the court's inquiry must be "whether or not the employer
can prove that his 'rule' requiring only English on the job is the result of busi-
ness necessity.",
8 1
Finally, the Saucedo court found that "a rule that Spanish cannot be spoken
on the job obviously has a disparate impact upon [bilingual and monolingual]
Mexican-American employees [because] [m]ost Anglo-Americans obviously
have no desire and no ability to speak foreign languages on or off the job."82
The Saucedo opinion thus foreshadowed two of the key suppositions of the mi-
nority view regarding English-only workplace rules. First, it assumed that an
English-only rule exerts a disproportionate burden on national origin language
74. Id. at 920.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 921. Saucedo had been ordered to bring a large metal part to Perez to be straightened. As
Saucedo brought the heavy part to Perez, he asked Perez, in Spanish, where he wanted Saucedo to place
the part ("donde lo quieres").
77. Id. at 922.
78. Id. Brothers' owner, Jarrel Nohavizta, retained Holliday (the "tool pusher") and did not rein-
state Saucedo after Holliday fired him. Remarkably, the court felt compelled to note in dicta that it
could "fully understand[ ]" the owner's actions "in permit[ting] and impliedly approv[ing] of' Holli-
day's "manifest racial discrimination" because "good tool pushers are undoubtedly hard to find." Id. at
920.
79. Id. at 921. "The only notice which Saucedo received ... was his conversation with Erdelt" and
he "did not tell Saucedo that the sanction for violation of the 'Holliday rule' was immediate discharge
or dismissal." Id. This part of the Saucedo decision was later codified into the EEOC Guidelines at
§ 1606.7(c).
80. Id. The court found that "Holliday's breach.., was much more likely to cause safety and other
problems than Saucedo's casual and harmless use of a Spanish phrase to another Mexican-American
who fully understood the phrase." Id.
81. Id. at 922.
82. Id.
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minorities, including bilinguals.83 Finally, like the EEOC, it understood the
most important issue to be whether the employer had a valid business justifica-
tion for its workplace English-only rule.
b. Garcia v. Gloor: Immutable Characteristics, Title VII, and the Ability to
Comply Rule
In 1980, immediately prior to the EEOC's amendment of its Guidelines to
specifically address English-only workplace rules, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals became the first federal appellate court to uphold an employer's Eng-
lish-only workplace rule. In Garcia v. Gloor,84 the court held that an English-
only rule can never have a disparate impact, even upon members of protected
national origin minority groups, if the employees impacted are "fully bilin-
gual. ,85
In Gloor, a bilingual Mexican-American employee (Hector Garcia) was
fired for violating a company rule that employees speak only English, except
when communicating with Spanish-speaking customers. Gloor Lumber and
Supply Company was a family-owned business in Brownsville, Texas. It em-
ployed thirty-nine employees, including thirty-one Hispanics with varying de-
grees of English fluency, in both their lumberyard and as salespersons in their
store.86 Garcia was one of eight salesman employed by Gloor, seven of whom
were Hispanic, "a matter perhaps of business necessity, because 75% of the
population in [Gloor's] business area is of Hispanic background and...
,,7wish[es] to be waited on by a salesman who speaks Spanish. '  While the com-
pany's rule allowed their employees to speak Spanish on the job only when
conversing with a Spanish-speaking customer, it did not apply to conversations
during work breaks nor to the monolingual Spanish-speaking yard workers.
88
Mr. Garcia was fired by a company official, who overheard him respond to
a question in English from an Hispanic employee about an item that a customer
had requested. Garcia replied in Spanish that the item was not available.
89
83. Although never explicitly stated in the court's opinion, Saucedo was undoubtedly bilingual. It
is highly unlikely that Mr. Erdelt's initial explanation to Saucedo, that "Doc" Holliday didn't tolerate no
"Mesican" talk, was told to Saucedo in Spanish. Also, Steve Perez replied in English when Saucedo
asked him in Spanish where he wanted the part to be placed.
84. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
85. Id. at 268. On this point, without ever mentioning Saucedo, the Gloor court directly contra-
dicted Saucedo, a case in its own circuit that had been decided less than eighteen months prior.
86. Id. at 267.
87. Id. The court ignored or overlooked the fact that a significant percentage of that majority
population may have had limited language skills, even though it later made the distinction between lim-
ited proficiency English-speaking employees and fully fluent bilingual employees a significant element
of its rationale.
88. Id. at 266.
89. Id. The phrase that likely got Mr. Garcia fired is "No hay mas." Each party disputed whether
Mr. Garcia's work record also contributed to his termination. The Circuit Court, however, in order to
reach the question of whether "an employer's rule forbidding a [fully] bilingual employee to speak
anything but English in public areas while on the job is... discrimination based on national origin,"
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The Gloor court held that an employer's limited English-only rule did not
have a significant disparate impact based on national origin when enforced
against an employee "who is fully capable of speaking English and chooses not
to do so in deliberate disregard of his employer's rule."90 The court began its
analysis by claiming that disparate impact inquiry under Title VII must be lim-
ited to immutable characteristics. The court reasoned that "the language a
person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a particular time is by definition a
matter of choice," or mutable, and therefore should not be protected.92
The court also discounted the connection between language and national
origin, warning that national origin should not be "confused with ethnic or so-
cio-cultural traits." 93 However, the court reserved judgment as to how an Eng-
lish-only rule might be applied to employees with limited or no English lan-
guage skills, noting that "[l]anguage may be used as a covert basis for national
origin discrimination, if the person only speaks the forbidden language or has
difficulty using another language than the one spoken in his home."
94
The Gloor court explicitly acknowledged that it was ruling in the absence
of any guidance on English-only workplace rules from the EEOC.95 The EEOC
adopted its regulation on such rules later that same year, most likely in response
to Gloor.
96
2. English-Only Jurisprudence Subsequent to the EEOC Guidelines: The
Ninth Circuit's Confused History
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is the only federal appellate
court to hand down a published opinion on English-only workplace rules since
the EEOC amended its Guidelines to address the subject in 1980.97 Garcia v.
Spun Steak98 has become the leading case, somewhat by default.
Prior to its Spun Steak decision, a unanimous Ninth Circuit panel had con-
cluded in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court that an English-only workplace rule at
assumed that Garcia's use of Spanish was "a significant factor" in his termination. Mr. Garcia's overall
work record therefore became a moot point. Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. "Save for religion, the discriminations on which the Act focuses ... are those that are either
beyond the victim's power to alter.., or that impose a burden on an employee on one of the prohibited
bases or where a fundamental right was thought to be involved." Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 270.
93. Id. at 269 (finding that "neither the statute nor common understanding equates national origin
with the language that one chooses to speak").
94. Id. at 270.
95. Id. at 269.
96. See Wiley, supra note 49, at 566 n.171.
97. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have issued unpublished opinions. See Long v. First Union
Corp., 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996), affg 894 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Va. 1995); Gonzalez v. Salvation
Army, 985 F.2d 578 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 910 (1993).
98. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1228 (1994).
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the Los Angeles Municipal Court had a significant disparate impact upon bilin-
gual court interpreters and other court employees. 99 Gutierrez rejected the
Gloor court's "ability-to-comply" rationale and instead relied on the EEOC
Guidelines in deciding that English-only workplace rules "generally have an
adverse impact on protected [language minority] groups [including bilinguals]"
and presuming that such rules would therefore "ordinarily constitute discrimi-
natory conditions of employment."' 0 0 Consequently, the Gutierrez court ruled
that an employer must first demonstrate a legitimate business necessity in order
to withstand a challenge to a limited workplace English-only rule. However,
Gutierrez was subsequently vacated as moot when the lead plaintiff quit her job
while the case was on appeal for certiorari to the Supreme Court.'
0
'
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Garcia v. Spun Steak was based on facts
similar to those in Gutierrez. A divided panel in Spun Steak directly contra-
dicted the Gutierrez holding. The court reasoned that English-only rules have
no impact on bilingual national-origin minorities, and specifically rejected the
EEOC Guidelines on which the Gutierrez court had relied.1
0 2
Spun Steak Company was a San Francisco wholesale meat and poultry dis-
tributor that employed thirty-three workers, twenty-four of whom spoke Span-
ish. 10 3 Two of the Spanish-speakers spoke no English, while the other employ-
ees had "varying degrees of proficiency in English."'1 4 Unlike the employees in
Gloor and Gutierrez, Spun Steak's employees were not required to speak or
understand English as a condition of employment.
10 5
In 1990, Spun Steak imposed an English-only rule in response to com-
plaints from two non-Spanish speaking employees that some of the Hispanic
workers were "using their bilingual capabilities to harass and to insult other
workers in a language they could not understand.' 1 6 Hispanic employees were
exempted from the rule during their lunch and break times. A rule forbidding
"offensive racial, sexual, or personal remarks of any kind" was also adopted.10 7
Priscilla Garcia and Maricela Buitrago, two of Spun Steak's Hispanic em-
ployees, received warning letters for speaking Spanish during working hours
99. Gutierrez v. Mun. Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 861 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989). The judges of the Southeast Judicial
District of the Los Angeles Municipal Court initially imposed an absolute prohibition on languages
other than English (notwithstanding the necessary exception for the court interpreters' translation du-
ties). They later amended the rule to except lunch-time and employee breaks. The plaintiffs brought
their claim against this limited ban. 838 F.2d at 1041, n.10.
100. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1044.
101. Gutierrez, 490 U.S. at 1016.
102. In a brief footnote, Judge O'Scannlain noted that because Gutierrez had been vacated as
moot, the panel was not bound by its reasoning. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1482.
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and were prohibited from working together for two months because of their
violation. When the employees' union could not get the company to reconsider
its rule, Garcia and Buitrago filed suit. They charged that the rule had a dis-
criminatory impact on the company's Hispanic employees in three ways: (1) it
denied them their right to express their cultural heritage in the workplace; (2) it
denied them a privilege enjoyed by monolingual English-speaking employees,
namely the privilege to speak their primary language; and (3) the rule created
an "atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation."'
0 8
The Spun Steak court found that the plaintiffs had not made out a prima fa-
cie case of disparate impact. 10 9 The court disposed of the plaintiffs' first charge
by reasoning that although "an individual's primary language can be an impor-
tant link to his ethnic culture and identity ... [Title VII] does not confer sub-
stantive privileges" such as "the ability of workers to express their cultural
heritage at the workplace."' 0
Next, the court addressed the plaintiffs' claim that the company's English-
only rule denied national origin minorities a privilege routinely enjoyed by the
company's native English speakers: the privilege to speak the language in
which they were most comfortable while on the job. The court began by re-
solving that "a privilege ... is by definition, given at the employer's discretion"
and therefore "an employer has the right to define its contours.""' Conse-
quently, the court adopted the employer's own narrow definition of the privi-
lege as the freedom to converse in English on the job. 12 The majority believed
that the privilege had no discriminatory impact on those plaintiffs who were bi-
lingual because they could freely engage in work-time conversation in Eng-
lish. 113 The Spun Steak majority therefore embraced the pre-Guidelines ration-
ale of Gloor by reasoning that "it is axiomatic that 'the language a person who
is multi-lingual elects to speak at a particular time is ... a matter of choice.""'14
Because of this, the court held that there is no disparate impact "if the rule is




Regarding the employees' final claim, the Spun Steak majority found that
the plaintiffs had "presented no evidence other than conclusory statements" that
the English-only policy "contributed to an atmosphere of isolation, inferiority
or intimidation." ' 1 6 The court conceded that determining whether a protected
group was adversely affected with regard to their "conditions, terms or privi-
108. Id. at 1486-87.
109. Id. at 1486.




114. Id. (quoting Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1489.
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leges of employment" may depend on "subjective factors, not easily quanti-
fied."1 7 Nevertheless, the majority decided that the fact that "the alleged facts
are subjective" does not allow the plaintiffs to satisfy their initial burden
"merely [by] assert[ing] that the policy has harmed members of the group to
which he or she belongs."' 18
Finally, the Spun Steak majority explicitly rejected the EEOC Guidelines on
English-only rules in the workplace, finding that it is clear that "Congress in-
tended a balance be struck in preventing discrimination and preserving the in-
dependence of the employer," which, they reasoned, the Guidelines did not
do.1 9 The court held that the EEOC's Guidelines' 20 contravened Congressional
intent in presuming that the mere existence of an English-only workplace rule
was enough to satisfy the plaintiff's burden to "demonstrate" disparate im-
pact. 12 As a result, the court found "'compelling indications that (the Guide-
lines are) wrong.""122
On this last point, there was a strong dissent by Judge Boochever, who ar-
gued that the panel should "defer to the [Equal Employment Opportunity]
Commission's expertise in construing the [Civil Rights] Act.' 23 Judge
Boochever contended that it would be difficult to imagine how a plaintiff might
satisfy her burden of proving discriminatory impact on her terms, conditions,
and privileges of work without referencing "conclusory self-serving state-
ments.., or possibly by expert testimony of psychologists."'' 24 Accordingly, he
believed that "while one may reasonably differ with the EEOC's position as a
matter of policy," he could find no compelling indication that the policy was125
wrong.
117. Id. at 1486. The Spun Steak majority noted that because the claim did not concern barriers to
hiring or promotion it was "outside the mainstream of disparate impact cases [we have] decided thus
far" and consequently a case of first impression. The court pointed out the difficulty of providing the
statistical evidence typically required to make out a primafacie case under disparate impact analysis in
a case concerning conditions of employment. Id. at 1485.
118. Id.
119. Id. 1490.
120. And, by inference, their own previous ruling in Gutierrez.
121. 998 F.2d at 1490. The Spun Steak majority required that in order to make a prima facie dem-
onstration of discriminatory impact, a plaintiff "must prove the existence of adverse effects of the pol-
icy, must prove that the impact of the policy is on terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the
protected class, must prove that the adverse effects are significant, and must prove that the employee
population in general is not affected by the policy to the same degree." Id. at 1486.
122. Id. at 1490 (quoting Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973), the case
that introduced the Supreme Court's standard for rejecting an administrative agency's procedural
guidelines).
123. Id. at 1490 (Boocheever, J., dissenting). Judge Boochever specifically pointed to the EEOC's
conclusion that English-only rules may 'create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation
based on national origin, which could result in a discriminatory working environment."' Id. (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1991)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1491.
Vol. 20:227, 2002
Spanish as Second-Hand Smoke
3. The Minority Position: Recent Developments
Two recent district court cases have considered new evidence and chal-
lenged the rationale of the Gloor-Spun Steak line of opinions with respect to
bilingual employees and workplace English-only rules. Together, they repre-
sent a developing minority position in support of the analysis of the EEOC
Guidelines.
a. Writing on a Clean Slate: EEOC v. Synchro-Start Products, Inc.
The court in EEOC v. Synchro-Start Products, Inc.,' 26 "writing on a clean
slate in this Circuit,"' 27 disagreed with the Gloor-Spun Steak majority rule and
held that the procedural method of the EEOC Guidelines (providing that an
employer's English-only rule presumptively violates Title VII with regard to
national origin minorities, unless the employer can establish a business neces-
sity for the rule) comports with the statutory requirements for a valid Title VII
claim.
Synchro-Start Products employed 200 employees, many of whom were of
Polish or Hispanic national origin and who spoke English with varying degrees
of proficiency.128 Beginning in September of 1997, Synchro-Start "required
[all] its employees to speak only English during working hours." 129 Addition-
ally, management "did not explain the consequences of violating the English-
only rule to its employees., 130 The EEOC brought suit claiming that the rule
had a disparate impact on the company's national origin minorities.
The Synchro-Start court held that, with respect to the subset of employees
who spoke little or no English, even under a Spun Steak analysis the EEOC had
plainly stated a viable claim.13 1 However, the Synchro-Start court found that it
could go "beyond that easy case ... to impose liability across a broader spec-
trum," specifically identifying those bilingual employees who can "readily
comply" with such a rule and "still enjoy the privilege of [conversation] on the
job." 132 The court reasoned that the EEOC's presumption of discriminatory im-
pact in the case of an English-only rule merely creates "an inference" that a
plaintiff is disadvantaged by an English-only rule (what the court calls an evi-
126. 29 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
127. Id. at 913. Synchro-Start was decided in the Seventh Circuit, which had no previous prece-
dent with regard to English-only workplace rules.
128. Id. at 912.
129. Id. The company's English-only rule made no accommodation for those employees with little
or no English language skills.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 913 (finding that even Spun Steak found that "as applied 'to a person who speaks only
one tongue or to a person who has difficulty using another language than the one spoken in his home'
an English-only rule might well have an adverse impact") (quoting Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d
1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)).
132. Id. (quoting Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487).
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dentiary tie-breaker) because of his or her national origin. 33 The EEOC's in-
ference is justified because an English-only rule may create "an atmosphere of
inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on national origin.' ' 134 Agreeing
with the dissent in Spun Steak, the court found that the only way to prove that
such an atmosphere caused a "significant disparate impact" is through the use
of subjective evidence, and not the traditional statistical evidence of a disparate
impact claim.'
35
b. To Choose or Not to Choose: EEOC v. Premier Operator Services
A recent ruling by a magistrate judge in the Fifth Circuit contradicts the ra-
tionale of its own Court of Appeals in Gloor. The district court in EEOC v.
• 136
Premier Operator Services called into doubt Gloor's "ability to comply" ra-
tionale by noting that extensive social science research contradicting many of
Gloor's assumptions had become available since Gloor was decided. The court
also determined that it was obligated to consider any relevant administrative
agency guidelines, promulgated subsequent to the Gloor decision.
1 37
Premier Operator Services was a class action suit, in which the plaintiffs,
thirteen bilingual Mexican and Mexican American telephone operators, had
been recruited and hired specifically for their bilingual abilities by the defen-
dant, Premier Operator Services ("Premier"). 138 Premier later enacted an Eng-
lish-only policy, prohibiting any employee conversations on the company
premises, except those conducted in English. The rule allowed conversation in
other languages only when speaking with non-English speaking customers.
1 39
The policy was posted at the entrance to the building where Premier was lo-
cated, along with a notice that "conspicuously couple[d] the policy with a
warning about weapons, implying a combined concern about the conduct of
133. Id. at 914. The court explained:
If the only evidence placed before the fact finder were the existence of such a rule, with no
explanation being proffered either way as to the reason for the rule or as to the manner in
which it actually impacts, that level of evidentiary silence would call for a verdict in the em-
ployee's favor rather then the employer's on the element of disparate impact. And in those
terms the question really becomes one of interpretation rather than of any effort to override
legislative intent-a proper sphere for extending deference to the agency's knowledge and ex-
perience.
Id.
134. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7).
135. Id. at 914-15. Judge Boochever, in dissent in Spun Steak, had agreed with most of the major-
ity's decision, but had disagreed strongly with the majority's refusal to defer to the EEOC Guidelines.
Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490-91.
136. 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
137. Id. at 1074.
138. Id. at 1068. Collect phone calls from Mexico comprised a significant portion of Premier's
business. The company needed Spanish-speaking operators to understand any requests from the collect
caller. See EEOC Wins English-only Lawsuit, Record-Breaking Award, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1551 (Oct. 30, 2000).
139. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
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those persons who speak a language other than English." 140 The company fur-
ther stipulated that it planned to install a public telephone outside of the build-
ing, so that in order to make any personal phone calls during which they might
need to speak Spanish (to monolingual Spanish-speaking family members, for
instance), Hispanic employees would have to exit the building. 141 Premier sub-
sequently required all the bilingual, Hispanic employees to sign a memo
agreeing that they knew of the policy and knew that violation of the policy
would result in their dismissal. 142 Six employees who refused to sign the memo
were immediately terminated, while another two who signed under protest and
then filed EEOC charges were terminated within 24 hours of Premier's receipt
of the charges. 143 The court also found that while all 13 of the employees who
had been terminated were Hispanic, all 14 employees who replaced them were
non-Hispanic. 144
In a preliminary ruling rejecting the defendant's pre-trial motion to dismiss
the Premier Operator Services court noted that its own Court of Appeals had
instructed the circuit's lower courts to consider changes in subsequent admin-
istrative regulations that might bear upon existing precedent in that Circuit.
45
The court recognized that Gloor had itself acknowledged that it was ruling in
the absence of any guidance from EEOC regulations. 46 Additionally, the court
relied on deliberations during passage of the 1991 Amendment to Title VII, in
the course of which there was agreement by some members of the Senate that
the EEOC's Guidelines represent a valid interpretation of Title VII. 141
140. Id. at 1069-70. The sign stated: "Absolutely No Guns, Knives or Weapons of any kind are
allowed on these Premises at any time! English is the official language of Premier Operator Services,
Inc. All conversations on these premises are to be in English. Other languages may be spoken to cus-
tomers who cannot speak English." Id.
141. Id. at 1069. It is difficult not to notice the similarity between the treatment of spoken Spanish
and the prohibition of cigarette-smoking in workplaces because of the deleterious health effects of sec-
ond-hand smoke (or "ETS" for environmental tobacco smoke). While the Environmental Protection
Agency has classified ETS as a Group A carcinogen (known to cause cancer in humans), see Press Re-
lease, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Exposure to Second-Hand Smoke Widespread (Apr.
1996), available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/secondl.htn, along with other highly
toxic substances like asbestos, radon, and benzene, exposure to Spanish of course has not been identi-
fied as the cause of any ill health effects.
142. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 75 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (following Kapche v. City of San Antonio, 176
F.3d 840 (5th Cir. 1999), which vacated a district court's grant of summary judgment based upon prior
case law, because the district court failed to consider changes in administrative regulations).
146. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. Even commentators who have rejected the
EEOC Guidelines have recognized that the Gloor court qualified its ruling when it noted the lack of
EEOC guidance available and also noted that the ruling has been "criticized as obsolete in light ofpost-
Gloor policy." Wiley, supra note 49, at 556-57.
147. 113 F. Supp. at 1074 (citing United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979) ("An
agency interpretation is entitled to greater deference when Congress is aware of the interpretation and
chooses not to change it when amending the statute in other respects")). The Premier Operator court
found that Congress specifically discussed the EEOC Guidelines regarding English-only rules during
the hearings and chose not to alter them. See infra Section M.F (discussing Congressional intent and
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The court also found that the psycho-linguistic research done since Gloor
demonstrated that speaking only English is not simply a matter of preference
for many bilingual national origin minorities. 48 Because of this information,
the court concluded, "Speak-only-English rules tend to impact people whose
national origin is from non-English speaking countries more heavily than it af-
fects others.' 49 Following the reasoning of the dissent in Spun Steak,5 ° it held
that the ability to comply should not be the measure of a rule's discriminatory
impact. 151
III. THE ANALYSIS
In addressing English-only workplace rules, the leading appellate court
cases have distinguished between "fully bilingual" employees and those lan-
guage minorities with limited or no English language skills. However, this at-
tempt at line drawing fundamentally misunderstands the relationship between
national origin and language, as well as the most recent research regarding bi-
linguals. While giving lip service to the importance of language for national
origin minorities, those cases have misunderstood the close connection between
one's primary language and how a workplace English-only rule exposes bilin-
gual national origin minorities to severe consequences.
A. Title VII and the Nexus between Language and National Origin
One of the key distinctions between the leading cases' view on English-
only workplace rules and the EEOC/minority view is their understanding of the
relationship between language and national origin for Title VII purposes. Since
restrictions on language use are never specifically mentioned in Title VII, 152 an
important initial question is how broad an interpretation Congress intended
when it prohibited employment discrimination based upon national origin in
deference to the EEOC Guidelines in addition to relevant text of the Senate hearing). This highly rele-
vant indication of Congressional intent in passing Title VII was ignored by the Spun Steak majority,
even though Spun Steak was decided nearly two years after these hearings took place.
148. 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. (finding that "the most recent and directly relevant.., research
[shows that] switching between English to Spanish is often inadvertent and unconscious" for someone
whose primary language is not English, but is still fully bilingual). "This 'code-switching' cannot be
turned off" and that person "cannot be forced to refrain from uttering a word of the primary language
simply upon direction ... because this switching is or can be an unconscious act." Id.
149. Id. at 1073 (citing EEOC v. Synchro-Start, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1999)).
150. 13 F.3d 296, 298 (1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
151. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1075 (quoting Spun Steak, 13 F.3d at 298
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting)) (noting that "[Slome of the most objectionable discriminatory rules are the
least obtrusive in terms of one's ability to comply: [African-Americans] being required to sit in the back
of the bus for example"). The magistrate judge in Premier Operator Services pointed out that, under an
ability-to-comply standard, "[A] black employee could not challenge a rule requiring the use of separate
bathrooms and drinking [fountains]; [and] an Orthodox Jew coiuld not challenge a rule forbidding the
wearing of head coverings." Id.
152. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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Title VII. '53
The leading appellate court cases on English-only rules have interpreted
Title VII narrowly with regard to language discrimination. In distinguishing
national origin from the ability to speak a foreign language, the Gloor court
specifically warned that "national origin must not be confused with ethnic or
socio-cultural traits or an unrelated status."' 154 The Spun Steak majority con-
ceded that, "even in the case of bilinguals, language provides an important link
to an individual's ethnic culture and identity." 155 Nonetheless, it chose to read
the statute narrowly when it indicated that it was strongly influenced by the fact
that neither the statute nor the legislative history specifically mentioned Eng-
lish-only rules. 1
56
However, such a narrow interpretation is not consonant with either scien-
tific or common understanding. Since the rise of the modem nation-state, lan-
guage has been intimately associated with nationality. 157 While most linguistic
scholars agree that language is one of the fundamental components of national-
ity,158 at least some consider language to be the most significant factor in de-
termining national or ethnic identity. 159 Numerous legal commentators exam-
ining the scientific literature have found an "inextricable link between language
and national origin."
'' 60
In addition, for some minorities, including Hispanics, language may be an
even stronger indicator of ethnic or national identification than is usual.1
61
153. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Like any
issue of statutory construction, the question of [the scope of Title VII coverage] turns solely on congres-
sional intent.").
154. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980).
155. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486.
156. Id. at 1489. But see id. at 1490 (Boochever, J., dissenting) (pointing out that "[t]he lack of
directly supporting language in [the Act] or in the legislative history of Title VII, relied upon by the
majority, does not ...make the Guideline inconsistent with an obvious congressional intent not to
reach the employment practice in question" (quoting Espinoza v. Farrah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95
(1973), for standard of deference to EEOC Guidelines in the absence of "compelling indications that it
is wrong.")); Perea, supra note 28 (reviewing Title VIl's legislative history and finding that Congress
spent very little time discussing national origin at all).
157. Robert D. King, Should English Be the Law?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1997, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/97apr/english.htm (analyzing the historical link between language
and nationalism and determining that "the marriage of language and nationalism goes back at least to
Romanticism").
158. See, e.g., RALPH FASOLD, I INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLINGUISTICS: LANGUAGE IN SOCIETY 5
(1984) (finding that language, culture, religion and history are the principal components of nationality).
159. See, e.g., JOSHUA FISHMAN, LANGUAGE AND NATIONALISM 46 (1972) (finding that "no factor
is more intimately tied to ethnic or national identity than is language"); King, supra note 157 (noting
that after the French Revolution "nationhood itself became aligned with language"). In his article, King
notes the lament of historian/economist Arnold Toynbee that, post-World War I, "the growing con-
sciousness of Nationality has attached itself neither to traditional frontiers nor to new geographical as-
sociations but almost exclusively to mother tongues." Id.
160. Adams, supra note 47, at 1329-30; see, e.g., Behm, supra note 12, at 593; Juan F. Perea,
English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One's Primary Language in the Workplace, 23 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 265, 276-77 (1990).
161. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980) (reviewing expert witness testimony
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Historically, the language characteristic has been a key identifier of outsider
status and a source of severe prejudice in nations around the world, 62 as well
as here in the United States.
1 63
Furthermore, many legal commentators, have pointed out that prejudiced
behavior is more often the result of animosity towards the underlying charac-
teristics that an ethnic minority exhibits, than of the literal fact of country of
national origin.164 It is, for instance, difficult to imagine that a tall, blond-
haired, blue-eyed, American of Mexican heritage who spoke English without
an accent, would experience the same level of discrimination in the United
States as would a shorter, dark-skinned, brown-eyed American of Mexican
heritage who spoke English with a heavy accent. One commentator has gone so
far as to state that, for the purposes of fulfilling Title VII's objectives, "what is
usually labeled national origin discrimination, is actually discrimination be-
cause of a person's ethnic traits."165
Additionally, a recent ruling in the Eleventh Circuit gives some guidance
regarding the scope of Congressional intent in including the national origin
term in Title VII. The court in Sandoval v. Hagan documented the numerous
instances, in both case law and federal policy, in which language and national
origin are recognized as having a nexus, particularly for the purposes of dispa-
rate impact analysis.' 
66
In Sandoval, the plaintiffs in a class action suit challenged Alabama's De-
partment of Motor Vehicles official policy requiring all portions of the state's
driver's license examination, including the written exam, to be administered in
English only. 67 Under the rule, interpreters, translation dictionaries, and other
that "for Mexican-Americans... the Spanish language is the most important aspect of ethnic identifi-
cation and it is to them what skin color is to others").
162. See Garcia v. Spun Steak, 13 F.3d 296, 298 (1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (noting that
language has historically been "a potent source of... discrimination" and citing ethnic conflicts over
language that have been waged over decades, including Basque and Catalan in Spain, as well as
Ukrainian in the Soviet Union).
163. See Mirand6, supra note 19 (noting that Spanish-speaking ability has been historically deval-
ued in the United States, e.g., "No Spanish" rules were the norm in schools throughout the Southwest
until the 1960s).
164. E.g., Stephen M. Cutler, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII,
94 YALE L.J. 1164, 1165 (1985) ("Differences in dress, language, accent and custom [individual char-
acteristics] . . . are more likely to elicit prejudicial attitudes than the fact of the [national] origin itself.");
Perea, supra note 28, at 833-34 (explaining that "[e]thnicity consists of... shared traditions [and] val-
ues.., which contribute to sense of distinctiveness among members of a group. These traits ... engen-
der a perception of group distinctiveness in persons who are not members of that group. It is the per-
ception of difference, often based on ethnic traits, that results in discrimination.").
165. Perea, supra note 28, at 809.
166. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11 th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alexan-
der v. Sandoval, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001). The plaintiffs in Sandoval brought the claim on the basis of
Title VI's prohibition against discrimination in any program that receives federal funding. However, the
Eleventh Circuit has adopted Title VH's proof analysis for purposes of proving Title VI discrimination.
Therefore, their ruling has the same impact on Title VII analysis within the circuit as it does on Title VI.
167. Id. at 487. In 1990, the Alabama legislature ratified an amendment to the state constitution
that designated English as the official language of the state, and directed "officials of the state [to] take
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interpretive aids were officially forbidden.
168
On appeal, the Department's only defense on the merits was that language
discrimination could never have a legally significant disparate impact on the
basis of national origin because it has never been found to serve as a proxy for
national origin. 169 The defense relied on Gloor and Spun Steak to support its
claim.1
70
The Sandoval court first found that the defendants had conflated intentional
discrimination and disparate impact analysis.' 7' The appellate panel clarified
that "the correct analysis is not whether language equals national origin, but
whether the policy.., has an unjustified disparate impact on the basis of na-
tional origin."' 72 Next, the Sandoval court held that, as a matter of law, lan-
guage restrictions in general and the Department's English-only policies in
particular can have a significant disparate impact on national origin minori-
ties.' 73 For support for this proposition, the appellate court analyzed "Supreme
Court precedent and longstanding congressional provisions and federal agency
regulations [that] have repeatedly instructed... that a nexus exists between
language and national origin" and consequently determined that language re-
strictions can have a disparate impact on national origin minorities. 74 There-
fore, Sandoval seems to discredit the narrower readings of national origin dis-
crimination originating in the Gloor-Spun Steak line of rulings.
However, Sandoval distinguished both Gloor and Spun Steak by pointing
out that the plaintiffs in those cases were "fully bilingual.' 75 The Sandoval
court limited its holding to those minorities with limited or no English language
skills, following the Gloor court's ability-to-comply rationale.1
76
So, if the effect on a bilingual national origin minority of an English-only
rule on a driver's test does not rise to the level of a legally cognizable disparate
all steps necessary to insure that the role of English as the common language of the state of Alabama is
preserved and enhanced." In response, the Department adopted a policy that required all portions of its
driver's license examination process to be administered in English only. Id. at 487-88.
168. Id. at 488. The court noted the Department still permitted non-English-speaking drivers from
other states and foreign countries to exchange a valid out-of-state license for an Alabama license with-
out taking the written exam. Furthermore, the Department's official policy continued to provide special
accommodations for illiterate, hearing-impaired, deaf, and disabled applicants. Id.
169. Id. at 508.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 509 ("While existing law is unclear as to whether language may serve as a proxy for
intentional national origin discrimination ... this question is tangential to disparate impact analysis.").
172. Id.
173. Id. at 510 (determining that "it is not the nature of the policy that is examined (by the court,
for disparate impact) but its effect... [f]f its effect is an unjustified disparate impact on the basis of
race, color, or national origin, the policy violates Title VII.").
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. The members of the class in Sandoval were defined as "all legal residents of the State of
Alabama who are otherwise qualified.., but cannot [obtain a driver's license] because they are not
sufficiently fluent in English." Id. at 488.
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impact, why should the same rule, affecting the same population, be recognized
as having an impact in an employment context? The answer lies in the likeli-
hood that bilinguals will violate the rule and in the consequences likely to be-
fall them if they do.
B. Distinguishing Sandovalftom the Workplace English-Only Cases
Socio-linguists find that multilingual persons who have learned two or more
languages while still young often unconsciously switch between the two "when
speaking informally with fellow members of their [own] cultural group." 177
This "code switching," as it is called in the literature, involves the alternation of
two languages within a single conversation, sentence, or even within constitu-
ent parts of a sentence. 178 An early study of bilingual Norwegians in the United
States found that "[s]peakers will often be quite unaware that they are switch-
ing back and forth between two languages; they are accustomed to having bi-
lingual speakers before them, and know that whichever language they use, they
will be understood."'' 79 Additionally, code switching has utility for bilinguals;
recent studies have confirmed bilinguals' tendency to engage in code switching
unconsciously as well as consciously "in order to achieve certain communica-
tive goals and convey socio-semantic connotations."
'1 80
Code switching would be largely irrelevant in the context of the Sandoval
case. The Sandoval court was chiefly concerned with any disparate impact on a
language minority's ability to comprehend English on a written driver's test.' 81
There was little concern that a bilingual language minority might "slip" into
their primary language during their driver's test. This would not endanger their
ability to understand and pass the (written) test. The rule created no penalty for
the language minority who may inadvertently speak a foreign language during
the test; it only required that the test be given in English.
C. Code Switching: Bilinguals' Propensity to (Inadvertently) Violate a
Workplace English-Only Rule
Conversely, code switching in workplace English-only cases is highly rele-
vant. Under such rules, bilingual employees are prohibited from speaking their
primary language for long periods every day, and code switching means that
177. EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (expert tes-
timony of Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson).
178. Shana Poplack, Sometimes I'll Start a Sentence in Spanish Y Termino in Espahol: Toward a
Topology of Code-Switching, 18 LINGUISTICS 581, 583 (1980).
179. Alfredo Mirandd, Now that I Speak English, no me Dejan Hablar ("I'm Not Allowed to
Speak'): The Implications of Hernandez v. New York, 18 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 115, 146 (1996)
(quoting EINAR HAUGEN, THE NORWEGIAN LANGUAGE IN AMERICA 65 (1969)).
180. Hans Dua, Perspectives on Code-Switching Research, 12 INT'L J. DRUIDIAN LINGUISTICS
136, 136-37 (1984).
181. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1282 (1998).
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bilingual employees are more likely to violate an English-only rule (and suffer
whatever consequences the employer has instituted).' 82
Contrary to the majority rule, the research into code switching indicates that
adhering to an English-only requirement is not simply a matter of preference
. 183
for many "fully" bilingual speakers, and that code switching cannot typically
be turned off and on in response to a rule. 184 This is particularly true for bilin-
gual speakers who grew up in communities where code switching is an ac-
cepted and common form of communication. 85
Additionally, socio-linguists find that, for bilinguals, conversation in a par-
ticular language often acts as an unconscious stimulus to continue using that
language in their subsequent conversation.' 86 This means that code switching is
especially relevant in service occupations, as in Gloor or Premier Operator
Services, where bilinguals are required to speak with, for instance, Hispanic
customers in Spanish, but are then prohibited from speaking anything but Eng-
lish to other Hispanic employees. Requiring this type of rigorous control over
language choice is particularly difficult for bilinguals who grew up, for exam-
ple, in Spanish-speaking households and in majority Hispanic communities,
where they "automatically" spoke Spanish, or "switched" between Spanish and
English, with anyone whom they assumed to be Hispanic and bilingual. This
would also explain how an English-only rule affects bilinguals in other types of
occupations, such as in Spun Steak and Synchro-Start, where the ethnic compo-
sition of the workplace mirrored the surrounding community, with significant
language-minority populations.187
The Gloor court seems not to have been aware of the code switching phe-
nomena 188 or not to have been persuaded by it.' 89 This is not unlikely, consid-
182. If, in fact, the courts provide protection for monolingual foreign language speakers from an
English-only workplace rule, as even the Gloor and Spun Steak majority have indicated they should,
bilinguals are the only ones likely to violate the rule and suffer the consequences.
183. NANCY FAIREs CONKLIN & MARGARET A. LOURIE, A HOST OF TONGUES: LANGUAGE
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1983).
184. EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (testimony
of expert witness Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson).
185. Id.
186. Telephone interview with Keith Walters, Associate Professor of Linguistics, University of
Texas at Austin (Sept. 18, 2001); Premier Operator Servs., 13 F.3d at 1070 (citing expert testimony of
Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson that "bilingual speakers will [often] ... continue to speak in the language in
which they most recently spoke, as in a case where an Operator turns to speak to a fellow worker imme-
diately following a conversation with a Spanish speaking customer").
187. The Spun Steak Company was an assembly line operation in San Francisco with a significant
majority of Spanish language speakers, all with varied proficiencies in English. Garcia v. Spun Steak,
13 F.3d 296, 297 (9th Cir. 1993). Synchro-Start Products, Inc. of Chicago employed significant popu-
lations of Polish- and Spanish-speaking employees, also with varied proficiencies in English. EEOC v.
Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911,912 (N.D. I11. 1999).
188. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1074 (finding that "Gloor was.., decided prior
to the [most recent] extensive research, studies and scientific findings" on code switching).
189. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980). Although Mr. Garcia testified that "he
found the English-only rule difficult to follow," the court accepted without comment the trial court's
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ering that the court specifically acknowledged that it was ruling in the absence
of an agency or statutory standard for testing English-only language rules or
any general policy to act as guidance. 90 Thirteen years later, however, the Spun
Steak court used the same rationale, following Gloor in finding that "it is axio-
matic that 'the language a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a par-
ticular time is... a matter of choice."'"19 1 In relying on such conclusive state-
ments about the nature of bilingualism, neither court cited any of the scientific
literature.
The code switching evidence directly contradicts these assumptions of rig-
orous control over language choice in all environments and instances. The
EEOC recognized this, post-Gloor, when it acknowledged in the 1987
Amendment to the Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin
that "it is common for individuals whose primary language is not English to in-
advertently change from speaking English to speaking their primary lan-
guage.
' ' 92
Conversely, there is not a comparable risk of violating such a rule for
monolingual native English speakers; in fact, there is no risk at all.' 93 Unlike
other facially neutral rules, English-only rules have an "exclusive adverse im-
pact" on language minorities.'94 Given the reasoning of the majority rule, 195 the
effects of English-only workplace rules are borne exclusively by bilingual em-
ployees. Unlike the driver's test restrictions in Sandoval, workplace English-
only rules specifically impact bilingual language minorities. Because of their
inadvertent propensity to violate workplace English-only rules, bilinguals are
disproportionately likely to suffer any consequences. Consideration of the code
switching evidence should have an enormous influence on a court's decision,
findings that "Mr. Garcia was fired [primarily] for... deliberately speaking Spanish on the job in pur-
poseful violation of the [English-only] ... rule." Id. at 266-68 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 268 n. 1. The court's holding that "there is no disparate impact if the rule is one that an
affected employee can readily observe and nonobservance is a matter of individual preference" indicates
no apparent awareness of the tendency of bilingual minorities to code switch. Id. at 270.
191. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487 (quoting Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270).
192. Guidelines at § 1606.7(c).
193. Perea, supra note 20, at 289, points out that normally, "facially neutral rules are facially neu-
tral because they operate to disqualify members of both the majority class and the protected minority
class." Thus, facially neutral height and weight requirements, that are often found illegal because they
unfairly disadvantage women, would also disqualify at least some men. On the other hand, an "English-
only rule, will never have any adverse impact on persons whose primary language is English. No mem-
ber of the majority ... will ever be disqualified because of the operation of the rule." Id. at 290.
194. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (pointing out that while Hispanic employ-
ees faced "the very real risk of being reprimanded or ... losing their jobs if they [even inadvertently]
violated the English-only rule ... there was no comparable risk ... [for] non-Hispanic employees, par-
ticularly since they would not have the same tendency to lapse into Spanish inadvertently"). Cf
Saucedo v. Bros. Well Serv., 464 F. Supp. 919, 922 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (finding that "[an English-only]
rule... obviously has a disparate impact upon Mexican-American employees. Most Anglo-Americans
obviously have no desire and no ability to speak foreign languages on or off the job").
195. The majority rule concludes that while monolingual and limited English proficiency employ-
ees might be able to bring a disparate impact claim against an English-only workplace rule, "fully" bi-
lingual employees never can.
Vol. 20:227, 2002
Spanish as Second-Hand Smoke
particularly when the opinion is grounded in an "ability to comply" rationale.
D. Code Switching: Consequences and the Majority's Crippling Burden of
Proof
Without ever mentioning code switching directly, the Spun Steak court
found the consequences for bilingual Hispanic employees to be insignificant.
196
The court admitted that the question of a bilingual speaker's inability to control
which language is used in a given situation "is a factual issue that cannot be re-
solved at the summary judgment stage."' 9 7 Nevertheless, the Spun Steak major-
ity voted to grant summary judgement to the defendants by finding that an em-
ployer's English-only rule "merely inconvenience[s]" bilingual employees,
because having "to catch himself or herself from occasionally slipping into
Spanish does not impose a burden significant enough to amount to the denial of
equal opportunity."'
' 98
Professor Alfredo Mirande has suggested that the analysis of the leading
opinions mirrors the "dominant" understanding of bilinguals as two monolin-
guals in one person. 199 According to this cumulative concept of language abil-
ity, being bilingual is merely an extension of being monolingual, and bilin-
gualism is likened to a faucet with hot and cold spigots that can be turned on
and off at will. 2°° In the early literature, code switching was described as either
linguistic interference or as a transitional phase from the regular use of one lan-
201guage to the use of another. This helps to clarify the majority's belief that it
is merely inconvenient for "fully" bilingual persons to refrain completely from
speaking their primary language for long periods at work, even when sur-
rounded by other members of their (minority-language) community. Similar to
the dominant model, the Spun Steak majority seemed to consider fully bilingual
persons as either those who have already made the transition from the less
adept stages of bilingualism or who, under an interference theory, are having
some trouble making the transition and may even benefit from the discipline of
an English-only rule. The thinking seems to be that code switching is a phase
that bilinguals will pass out of, as long as they keep at it.
202
Alternatively, recent analysis recognizes the utility of code switching for
196. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488. In addressing the plaintiffs' claim that "for them, switching
from one language to another is not fully volitional," the court distinguished between a rule that "merely
inconvenience[s]" some employees and "those policies that have a significant impact." Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Supra note 180.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 140 (citing U. WEINRICH, LANGUAGES IN CONTACT 1 (1968)).
202. One problem with this dominant model is that it does not accurately describe the experience
of the great majority of "fully" bilingual national origin minorities. Often they have learned both their
primary and secondary languages concurrently, or, if not, while still very young, and there has been no
transitional learning phase. This undercuts the cumulative concept of the traditional view.
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203bilinguals. Both the Supreme Court and the scientific literature have ac-
knowledged that bilingual speech is a more complex phenomenon than previ-
ously understood. 204 Rather than linguistic interference, code switching has
been described as "linguistic adaptation by bilingual speakers" with its own
"subset of grammatical rules or knowledge that permits bilinguals to code
switch effectively." 20 5 Rather than a transitional phase, code switching is better
understood as an alternative set of practices for language use by bilinguals, and
perhaps their most effective means of communication, particularly when
206
speaking with other bilinguals. This helps to clarify the minority/EEOC po-
sition that the courts should require businesses to articulate a valid business
justification for a rule that severely limits the ability of many bilinguals to
207speak their most effective "dialect" on the job. If one considers that mono-
lingual Anglo employees continue to enjoy the privilege of conversing in their
most effective language, the majority rule begins to look like "exactly the sort
of preferential treatment [for the majority] that the Act meant to eliminate." 208
For bilinguals, the disparity in workplace privileges imposed by an English-
only rule has consequences that reach far beyond the "mere inconvenience" of
having to check their natural instinct to combine both English and their primary
language in their conversations. A brief synopsis of the case law demonstrates
that bilinguals are often "subject to reprimand and adverse employment deci-
,,209sions when attempting to communicate in an 'English-only' workplace. In
both Saucedo and in Gloor, prototypical code-switching incidents resulted in
210termination of employment for the bilingual employees. In fact, in Saucedo
203. Supra note 180 and accompanying text.
204. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 370 (1991) (finding that "the term bilingual does not
describe a uniform category. It is a simple word for a more complex phenomenon with many distinct
categories and subdivisions."); Mirand6, supra note 19, at 94-5 (surveying the scientific literature and
concluding that bilinguals who code switch are combining two languages "in a complex and unique
communicative process that cannot be classified clearly as [one language or the other]").
205. Mirand6, supra note 179, at 141.
206. An early study found that while some information is readily accessible in either language, the
accessibility of certain information (in this study, words referring to abstract concepts like "justice, wis-
dom and freedom") is linked to the language by which it was stored in the mind. Mirand6, supra note
179, at 137 (citing Paul A. Kolers, Bilingualism and Information Processing, 218 SCI. AM. 78 (1968)).
This suggests a significant disparity between a native English speaker and a bilingual national origin
minority's opportunity or "privilege" to engage in conversation on the job, without perhaps reverting to
their primary language, and facing the consequences.
207. It is important to recall that under the Gloor-Spun Steak majority rule, a business's rationale
for an English-only workplace rule can be completely arbitrary, because the majority finds that such a
rule imposes no significant impact upon bilingual national origin minorities.
208. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (noting that "the objective of Con-
gress in the enactment of Title VII... was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and to re-
move barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees") (emphasis added).
209. See Behm, supra note 12, at 595.
210. See Sections H.A-1I.B supra. Although the trial court found that Garcia was fired (primarily)
for deliberately speaking Spanish on the job, in purposeful violation of the company's English-only
rule, Garcia had testified that "he found the English-only rule difficult to follow." Garcia v. Gloor, 618
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the consequences reached beyond even Saucedo getting fired, to his Hispanic
colleague, who was beaten when he protested Saucedo's firing and the rule. In
Premier Operator Services, the consequences of an English-only rule had an
institutional disparate impact upon language minorities, as thirteen Hispanic
employees were fired and replaced within three months with fourteen Anglo
• 211
employees. The Spun Steak majority dismissed as "conclusory" plaintiff's
evidence of demeaning and humiliating consequences for violating that com-
pany's English-only rule.2 12 Testimony from the Synchro-Start decision showed
how the benign use of a foreign language at work is treated analogously to ex-
posure to second-hand cigarette smoke, whose effects have been demonstrated
213to be far from benign. However, these types of incidents recur with disheart-
214
ening frequency in workplace English-only cases. Nevertheless, the Gloor-
Spun Steak majority rule insists upon a fact-specific inquiry in every instance
and rejects the EEOC's findings and its presumption of impact.215
Behind the leading opinions' unwillingness to examine the subtleties of bi-
lingual populations appears to be the distinctions they are (implicitly) making
between discrimination in hiring or promotion and an employer's ability to
216manage their workplace. While it is clear that Congress intended some type
of balance between a business' ability to manage their own affairs and dis-
criminatory behavior in their employment practices, the plain language of the
statute, of course, makes no such distinction in including "terms, conditions or
privileges" in the same prohibition as rules on hiring and promotion. 217 In fact,
the Supreme Court has identified the phrase "terms, conditions and privileges"
as "an expansive concept" that evinces Congress' "intent to strike at the full
F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980).
211. See EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
212. See Chen, supra note 6, at 162-63 (internal citations omitted). The plaintiffs reported that the
owner "screamed at" his bilingual employees in front of other employees for speaking Spanish and told
one of them to "go back to your own country" if she wanted to speak Spanish. They also reported that
the owner accused another bilingual employee, once again in the presence of her colleagues, of deliber-
ately influencing another Hispanic employee to speak Spanish, even though their conversation was pri-
vate and the other employee was significantly less proficient in English. The two named plaintiffs in the
class action had been separated and not permitted to work near each other for two months after violating
the English-only policy.
213. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
214. See, e.g., Associated Press, Housekeepers Told to Speak Only English Get Settlement, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2001, at A24 (reporting that a supervisor of the housekeeping staff at a private univer-
sity "routinely called [her subordinates] 'dumb Mexicans'... [and the housekeepers] were hit and their
hair and their ears were pulled" but "the supervisor became most angry when the housekeepers spoke
Spanish").
215. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1486-89 (9th Cir. 1993).
216. See, e.g., id. at 1489-90 (rejecting the EEOC's Guidelines on National Origin Discrimination,
the court relied on the statement of Congressman McCullogh that "management prerogatives and...
[the] internal affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be interfered with except to the lim-
ited extent that correction is required in discrimination practices"). Statement of William M. McCul-
loch, et al., H.R. REP. No. 914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2516.
217. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001).
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spectrum of disparate treatment. ' 218 There is no indication that discrimination
in these areas of employment should be taken any less seriously than in hiring
and promotion.
In accord with this excessive deference to business prerogatives, the major-
ity rule requires an exceedingly high burden of proof for a plaintiffs cause of
action based upon discrimination in their "terms, conditions and privileges" of
employment.219 However, given the evolving understanding of bilingual lan-
guage practices and capabilities, the majority analysis is mistaken. The Su-
preme Court has indicated that changes in relevant facts or intervening scien-
tific knowledge should prompt a reconsideration of precedents that rely on
those facts.220 The courts would do well to re-examine English-only workplace
rules and their full actual impact on bilingual national origin minorities.
E. The Case for Deference to the EEOC Guidelines
Contrary to the majority view of bilingual national origin minorities and the
discriminatory impact of English-only workplace rules, the EEOC Guidelines
presume that such a rules can "create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and
intimidation based on national origin. ' 221 The more recent understanding of bi-
lingual national origin minorities and the code switching phenomenon supports
the EEOC's broader interpretation of national origin that includes one's pri-
. . - .. ,222
mary language as "an essential national origin characteristic.
Nevertheless, the Spun Steak majority explicitly rejected the Guidelines,
reasoning that "it is clear that Congress intended a balance to be struck in pre-
venting discrimination and preserving the independence of the employer,"
218. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1985).
219. The Spun Steak majority admitted that, it is "often difficult to compile" the requisite statistics
to prove a prima facie disparate impact case even for the more typical claim of discrimination in hiring
or promotions. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486. However, the Spun Steak majority conceded that "when
the alleged disparate impact is on ... privileges of employment," a plaintiff's prima facie case "may
depend on subjective factors, not easily quantified," making the proof seemingly even more difficult. Id.
Nevertheless, the majority insists that this "does not relieve the plaintiff of their burden to prove dispa-
rate impact." Id. (emphasis added). The court then proceeds to lay out a four-part test that would almost
seem to require the use of statistical evidence.
The court also rejects the EEOC's findings, requiring an employer to offer up a valid business justi-
fication for imposing an English-only rule, because they believe that a "fact-specific" inquiry is re-
quired each time that an employee claims disparate impact because of such rule.
220. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(suggesting that overruling can be appropriate when "facts have so changed, or come to be seen so dif-
ferently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification") (emphasis added); see
also Kapche v. City of San Antonio, 176 F.3d 840, 847 (5th Cir. 1999) (vacating a district court's grant
of summary judgment based upon prior case law when the appellate court found that drivers with insu-
lin-dependent diabetes should not be deprived a license, as a matter of law, because of new treatment
methods and more recent empirical data showing that such drivers "pose no greater threat than do driv-
ers without the disease").
221. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a).
222. Id.
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223
which they claimed the Guidelines did not do. The court reasoned that the
EEOC's Guidelines contravened Congressional intent in presuming that the
mere existence of an English-only workplace rule was enough to satisfy the
224plaintiffs burden to demonstrate disparate impact. Judge Boochever, in his
dissent, found no "compelling indications that [the Guidelines are] wrong." 225
The amount of deference that is due to the EEOC's Guidelines is a significant
factor in the disagreement between the majority rule that rejects the Guidelines,
and the emerging minority rule that relies on them.
The Supreme Court has instructed that when a statute is silent or ambiguous
on an issue, a court should defer to the interpretation by the agency responsible
for enforcing the act, if that interpretation is "based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute. 226
While the EEOC Guidelines on National Origin Discrimination 227 are not
administrative regulations, promulgated pursuant to formal procedures estab-
228lished by Congress, they do constitute "[t]he administrative interpretation of
the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Act by the enforcing agency."229 Conse-
quently, they are "entitled to great deference, " in the absence of "compelling
indications that [they are] wrong." 230
The Supreme Court has also established a fairly extensive set of criteria for
courts to use in evaluating whether (EEOC) agency guidelines are based on a
permissible construction of an Act.231 In General Electric v. Gilbert, the Court
announced that the level of deference "will depend upon the thoroughness evi-
dent in [the Agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consis-
tency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if not to control., 23 2 In addition, the Court has found that
such guidelines are generally entitled to greater deference where Congress
knew of the interpretation, but left it intact while amending other aspects of the
relevant statute.
233
223. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490.
224. Id.
225. Id. (Boochever, J., dissenting) (quoting Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93 (1973)).
226. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
227. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.
228. See Theodore W. Wern, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act,
the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 1551-52
(1999) (noting that with regard to Title VII, Congress specifically did not grant the EEOC the authority
to promulgate regulations with the force of law). Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a), the EEOC was only
given authority to issue "suitable interpretive or procedural guidelines." See Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
229. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
230. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93 (1973).
231. See generally General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976).
232. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (quoting General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
233. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979).
Yale Law & Policy Review
The Spun Steak majority's rejection of the EEOC's Guidelines is fatally
flawed for a number of reasons. First, while imposing a particularly daunting
four-part test on the plaintiffs to prove their prima facie case, 234 the court itself
simply ignored the Supreme Court's four-part Gilbert test that would have indi-
cated how much deference the Spun Steak court should have given to the
EEOC Guidelines. 235 In fact, the majority's entire analysis that there were
"compelling indications" that the EEOC's Guidelines on English-only work-
236place rules were wrong, took less than one page. As Judge Boochever indi-
cated in dissent, while the majority may disagree with the EEOC's position as a
matter of policy, they demonstrated little in the way of compelling indications
that the EEOC Guidelines are manifestly mistaken in interpreting the Act.
By contrast, the EEOC Guidelines satisfy all of the Supreme Court's
Gilbert criteria, as a number of commentators pointed out in the wake of the
. . 237
Spun Steak decision. The thoroughness of the Commission's consideration is
evident in the comprehensive process followed by the Commission in adopting
238the Guidelines. As Edward Chen has pointed out, thoroughness of consid-
eration is also demonstrated by the comprehensive compliance manual that the
Commission published, detailing procedures on how to investigate English-
only workplace rules and discussing theories of discrimination and language
239
rights issues.
Furthermore, the validity of the Commission's reasoning that English-only
workplace rules tend to create "an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and in-
timidation" is demonstrated by the potential "pernicious and coercive effect" of
240
such rules on national origin minorities. Finally, both earlier and later pro-
nouncements of the Commission have been consistent with the Guidelines.
There seems to be no reason for the Spun Steak court not to have utilized
the Gilbert standards if they were intent on rejecting the Guidelines. It is true
that the Supreme Court has split over which set of criteria courts should use in
234. See supra note 119.
235. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
236. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489-90.
237. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 6, at 181-84 (determining that "[i]n rejecting the Guidelines, the
panel in Garcia ignored specific factors the Supreme Court has identified as relevant in evaluating ad-
ministrative interpretations by the EEOC"); Todd Kolarik, Note, Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.: Disparate
Impact Plaintiffs Challenging Speak-English-Only Rules Under a "Hostile Environment" Theory Must
Prove Actual Adverse Impact, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 655, 685-89 (1995).
238. In response to its request for public review and comment of its proposed revision to the
Guidelines, the Commission received approximately 250 comments from individuals, civil rights or-
ganizations, business associations, educational institutions, and public and private employers. As the
Commission noted, much of the commentary was directed at § 1606.7, the section of the Guidelines
that specifically addressed English-only workplace rules. The Commission also consulted with repre-
sentatives from the federal government on the revision of the guidelines. It then classified and consid-
ered all comments, responded to recurring criticisms raised, and revised the Guidelines accordingly. 45
Fed. Reg. 62,728.
239. See Chen, supra note 6, at 182-83 (citing 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 4001-35).
240. Id. at 183; see also notes 211-216 supra and accompanying text.
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evaluating the EEOC's Guidelines in a given circumstance. However, the other
standard that members of the Court have considered is less stringent than the
Gilbert standard, and requires that the Guidelines "need only be reasonable to
be entitled to deference. 241 Under either standard, the findings and analysis of
the Guidelines deserve greater deference.
Next, the Spun Steak majority claims that they "are not aware of... any-
thing in the legislative history to Title VII [that] indicates [support for the
EEOC position]. 242 However, just two years earlier, Congress had passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and, inter alia, had specifically amended Title VII
with regard to its disparate impact standard.243 In an exchange between Senator
DeConcini and Senator Kennedy, the former stated his concern, for the record,
that a number of his constituents had been subjected to "non-job related disci-
pline and termination" as a result of English-only workplace rules.244 Both
agreed that the EEOC Guidelines were a "sound and effective method for
dealing with the problem" and that the Guidelines would be consistent with Ti-
245tie VII, as amended. Significantly, the Supreme Court has held that such in-
terpretative guidelines are generally entitled to even greater deference where
there is evidence that Congress knew of the interpretation, but left it intact
while amending other aspects of the relevant statute.246
Finally, the Gloor-Spun Steak majority rule will create perverse incentives
that violate Congress' intent in passing Title VII. Under the majority rule,
"fully" bilingual employees never have a cause of action against an employer
since, under a Gloor-Spun Steak analysis, an English-only rule never impacts
247bilingual national origin minorities (or else any impact is insignificant).
241. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259-260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quot-
ing EEOC v. Commercial Office Paper Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988)).
242. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993).
243. See generally Michael F. Patterson, Note, Garcia v. Spun Steak Company: English-Only
Rules in the Workplace, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J 277, 289 (1995).
244. 137 CONG. REC. 15,489 (1991).
245. Id. Consider the following excerpt of the interchange:
Mr. DeCONCINI. Many of my constituents have brought to my attention an increasing prob-
lem with nonjob [sic] related discipline and termination of people for speaking languages
other than English in the workplace. Is the Senator aware of the EEOC regulations dealing
with this problem? Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, the EEOC promulgated such regulations in 1980.
Mr. DeCONCINI. These regulations reflect the fact that the primary language of an individual
is often an essential national origin characteristic. Does the Senator agree that these regula-
tions found in 29 CFR 16067.7 [sic, 1606.7] provide a sound and effective method for deal-
ing with this problem? Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, I agree that this regulation has worked well
during the past 11 years it has been in effect. Mr. DeCONCINI. Does the substitute to § 1745
in any way adversely affect the EEOC regulation on language use in the workplace. [sic, "?"]
Mr. KENNEDY. No, it does not. Mr. DeCONCINI. Therefore, if [the bill] is passed and
signed into law by the President, the EEOC regulations would be consistent with title VII as
amended by § 1745.
Id.
246. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979).
247. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490.
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However, this creates an incentive for employers never to offer a business justi-
fication for an English-only rule. Any business rationale offered for such a rule
may expose them to charges of intentional discrimination, specifically based
upon the justification for the rule. The legally savvy employer, who may have
to hire some national origin minorities less proficient in English but who wants
to institute an English-only rule, has an incentive to hire those applicants most
proficient in English, regardless of the need for the position. They would then
have a ready-made argument that his or her employees are certainly proficient
248
enough to "choose to" abide by the rule. This type of outcome lends support
to the argument that the majority rule does not address "the real menaces" that
Title VII "should address in English-only cases: over broad employment poli-
cies, discriminatory implementation of workplace rules, the unnecessary use of
English-only policies where less-discriminatory alternatives exist, and the use
of facially-neutral rules to mask intentional discrimination.
24 9
Admittedly, the majority rule may protect private employers from at least
the possibility of an EEOC hearing, if not a lawsuit. However, the requirement
of a business rationale under an EEOC-type rule achieves three ends that are
consonant with Congress' intentions in passing Title VII. The necessity to ar-
ticulate a business justification encourages employers to more thoroughly con-
sider their motivations for instituting an English-only rule. In the same context,
employers would be more likely to consider whether their purposes could be
achieved with a less sweeping or intrusive rule. Finally, the need to justify such
a rule would act as an incentive to employers to work more closely with their
diverse employment force in fashioning rules that create an harmonious work-
place. These types of incentives are certainly closer to Congress' Title VII ob-
jectives of "assur[ing] equality of employment opportunities and ...elimi-
nat[ing] those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens' 25° while
also allowing "management prerogative . .. to be left undisturbed. . . except to
.. ,,251
the limited extent that correction is required in discrimination practices. Be-
cause the EEOC method of analysis offers an opportunity to set incentives that
more accurately fulfill Congress' objectives, the Guidelines deserve a great
deal more deference from the courts than they have received up to now.
IV. CONCLUSION
English-only workplace rules have important social and legal implications.
Given the increasingly diverse character of our nation's workplaces, disputes
over English-only rules are likely to become more frequent. Additionally, al-
248. Of course, such motives may be acting more at the margins than is portrayed here.
249. Patterson, supra note 226, at 290 (citing 2 EEOC Compliance Manual).
250. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977).
251. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489.
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though most cases up to now have involved Latino employees, the issue has
wide-spread ramifications affecting all bilingual workers.
252
Significant numbers of new entrants to America's labor force speak a lan-
guage other than English as their primary language. They can generally be ex-
pected to speak their primary language to their fellow employees who are
members of their own ethnic group. Additionally, monolingual employers and
supervisors can generally be expected to continue to want to restrict the use of
other languages in the workplace.
The courts' essential misunderstanding of the language characteristic for
bilingual national origin minorities will continue to expose them to significant
harm based on their often-inadvertent tendency to use both languages inter-
changeably. The courts would do better to rely on the recognized expertise of
the EEOC and defer to their Guidelines in this area of crucial public policy.
253
252. See Chen, supra note 6, at 159 (noting that Asian and Pacific Islanders have brought several
challenges to Speak-English-Only rules, including Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Medical Ctr.,
775 F. Supp. 338 (C.D. Cal. 1991), which was settled while an appeal was pending in the Ninth Cir-
cuit).
253. Congress has recognized the unique expertise of the EEOC in the area of employment dis-
crimination. H.R. REP. No. 92-238 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N 2137, 2146 ("Administra-
tive tribunals are better equipped to handle the complicated issues involved in employment discrimina-
tion cases.").

